

Governance and Revolution in Egypt

Seyed-Masoud Mousavi-Shafae*
Farzaneh Naghdi**

Abstract

The sudden and unpredicted 2011 revolutions in Arab countries have been one of the most important socio-political phenomena in the Middle East. The Egyptian rebellion was at the centre of attention because of its national, regional, and political impacts and consequences. Therefore, understanding the drives behind the uprising will provide remarkable insight into the recent unrest in the Middle East. Raising the question of how has the bad governance prompted the Egyptian revolution? We consider the analysis of collected data corresponding to good governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, governance effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) to evaluate the Egyptian government's performance on the eve of the revolution. Having investigated the indicators of good governance in Egypt, we support the hypothesis that the Egyptian revolution was linked to the absence or weakness of the above indicators. In our view, extensive corruption in the public sector, socioeconomic disparity, lack of transparency in the political system, inefficiency of public institutions, centralisation of power, resources and special authorities in the hands of a group associated with the ruling government, the government's unresponsive attitude, and ultimately non-fulfilment of good governance principles as well as the increasing gap between the rich and poor led to the instability and vulnerability of the political system, which eventually resulted in the Egyptian revolution in January 2011.

Keywords: Good Governance, Revolution, Freedom of Speech, Transparency, Accountability, Political Stability, Rule of Law, Corruption

* Assistant Prof. of International Relations Tarbiat Modares University Tehran, Iran (E-mail: shafae@modares.ac.ir)

** Ph.D. Candidate of International Relations Tarbiat Modares University
(Received: 10 April 2014 Accepted: 28 August 2014)

Introduction

The relentless uprisings, street demonstrations and revolutions in the Arab world, which led to the removal of the region's established dictators, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Zane El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia were the expressions of dissatisfaction by the citizens of the Middle East with terrible living conditions; poverty, unemployment and corruption, as well as, their desire to institute social justice. Arab revolutionary movements and protests were interpreted differently as Islamic Awareness (Beheshtipour, 2011) and Arab Spring. Different researchers pointed out several influential factors, such as Western/American influential agents (Iqbal, 2012) and role of the youth, media and virtual networks (Kassem Chebib & Minatullah Sohail: 2011).

According to the Economist magazine, Egyptian statistics had shown significant progress in various socioeconomic sectors; namely GDP growth, foreign investment, reduction in child mortality and illiteracy rate (up to 2011 revolution). However, had all citizens from different levels and communities enjoyed such economic productivity? Was literacy linked with inflation and employment rates? Had the Egyptian press and broadcasters enjoyed freedom of speech? Why, despite economic growth during Mubarak's presidency, would people complain about poverty, unemployment and other socioeconomic problems? Why thousands of Egyptians took to the street protests and resisted until the ruling government was overthrown?

Chalmers Johnson emphasises that revolutions are natural social

events, which usually balances social values, rather than a violent and destructive movement. He believes that when value balance, which differs from one society to another, moves towards instability and the ruling system faces recession and volatility for a long period; elites fail to make proper decisions or take appropriate alternative measures corresponding to new concepts or values; and simultaneously accelerating factors, such as loss of integrity or loyalty of the military, come to worsen the circumstances, consequently, the opponents' chance to oppose the ruling regime will be boosted and the probability of revolution increases (Cohen, 1990: 133–136).

Vast studies have been completed on good governance indicators and their impacts on various socioeconomic issues, such as the improvement of human behaviour (Hadavand, 2005), economic development, and reduction of poverty and corruption (Khan, 2011). Given that, different factors including good governance as well as internal issues determine a government's performance, particularly in turbulent region that is the Middle East; this article illuminates how weak governance in Egypt led to the 2011 revolution. Good governance indicators were studied in the years leading up to the Egyptian revolution and analysis of the data indicates that extensive corruption in the public sector, socioeconomic disparity, lack of transparency in the political system, inefficiency of public institutions, centralisation of power, resources and special authorities in the hands of a group associated with the ruling government, the government's unresponsive attitude, and ultimately non-fulfilment of good governance principles as well as the increasing gap between the rich and poor led to the instability and vulnerability of the political system, which eventually resulted in the Egyptian revolution in January 2011.

In the followings, we provide supportive examples together with statistical data in order to demonstrate the relationship between weak governance and the Egyptian revolution, while defining good governance and its indicators. At the end, conclusions will be presented.

In 1992, at the end of the Cold War, an independent committee of three international institutions; the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and International Monetary Fund (IMF), was formed to carry out research on the solutions to live in a safer and more competitive world, away from injustice. As a result, a new concept – good governance – was introduced in a report in 1995 (ECLAC, 2011: 4). Based on the new findings in the 1990s, sole attention to the size and dimensions of the government does not necessarily lead to a development programme or improvement of living standards; instead, the performance of a government and, particularly, its commitment to rules and principles may lead to a nation's growth.

Understanding the importance of the government's role in offering public welfare and economic development, the World Bank offered a two-dimensional strategy to empower the government. First, is to adjust the strategy with the government's capacity. That is, in some countries ownership rights and market's free activity are priorities while for others a fair income distribution matters. Second refers to the growth of government capacity, meaning the effectiveness and improvement of the government's capacity are considered by adopting policies such as promoting decentralisation, judicial reform, anti-corruption and transparency of the budget system. (Midari, 2004: 190–192)

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (UNDP) describes nine features of good governance as follows: 1- participation; 2- rule of law; 3- transparency; 4- responsiveness; 5- decision-making based on consensus; 6- equality and equity; 7- efficiency and effectiveness; 8- accountability; and 9- holding a strategic vision (UNDP policy document – Good Governance – and sustainable human development, 1997). On this basis, good governance comprises management of public affairs by means of the rule of law, a fair and efficient judicial system, and the nation's widespread participation in the governance process.

Despite numerous definitions by various organisations, the World Bank has presented the most applicable framework for reliable and appropriate assessment of governance in countries so that other organisations and countries most commonly use its six indicators (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, governance effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption). Southeast Asian states, for instance, have achieved favourable management results by implementation of such principles. (Midari and Kheirkhahan, 2004: 192–195)

Prior to introduction of the six indicators of good governance and their relationship with the Egyptian revolution, let us briefly define poor governance. Weak or poor governance exists in contrast with good governance and is associated with despotic leaders (for example Qaddafi, Mugabe and Mubarak), non-democratic elections, and non-free media, especially in the Middle East and Africa. When speaking of bad or weak governance, weakness of public services and limited partnership of citizens in shaping their future and fate is undermined, the most important outcomes of which are widespread corruptions across the country, unequal distribution of resources, lack of economic development and a weak educational and welfare system. (Mohamed Mead, 2013) Despite access to the major natural resources, governments and their representatives are incapable or unreliable in the management of public resources in order to meet needs of the nation. The ruling authority does not respect the rights of citizens (i.e. right of ownership) and the necessity to establish primary welfare services (improvement of social programmes) or improve infrastructure. Thus, socioeconomic deficiencies lead the country towards devastation and destruction. (OECD, 2005: 2–3)

Applying good governance indicators and their effective role in different administrative parts of countries such as reductions in public expenses, and child mortality (below five years old), as well as, improvement of educational and health systems, increased the creditability of the indicators so that they became popular as

standardised international criteria in assessing the performance of governments. Since 1996, the World Bank has been carrying out annual assessments of the governance quality in over 200 countries based on the above indices and using statistics from about 40 information sources, which are regularly extracted and updated by more than 30 different organisations in the world (Midari and Kheirkhahan, 2004: 260–262). In order to develop the hypothesis, we will continue with the Egyptian revolution and its relationship with indicators of good governance.

Below, each of six indicators has been defined and then surveyed in Egypt, on the eve of revolution. Collected data summarized in examples, tables and charts.

I. Voice and Accountability: This indicator includes citizens' basic rights, selection of the ruling government through democratic and fair elections, freedom of expression, freedom of associations, trade unions, political parties and institutions, as well as, transparency of information, government accountability through civil institutions or mass media, and finally freedom of the press and media for distribution of information.


Being reluctant to apply legal procedures or establish responsive communities, Mubarak could not successfully interact with his people and thus lost his political legitimacy. Holding single-candidacy presidential elections within three continuous periods from 1981 to 2005, manipulating the results of presidential (2005) or parliamentary (2010) elections, the system's resort to force or bribery for restricting press and media's free activities, unreasonable detention and torture of citizens, limited educational system, keeping popular parties and associations in isolation under control of government (activities membership in non-governmental parties were illegal unless permitted by Egyptian government).

International Organization for Human Rights in Egypt, reported numerous cases of prisoners who were tortured and deprived of contact with their families often for no specific crime, and in case of

any objection to prison terms, they would be transmitted to a worse prison. (Moustafa, 2012: 11-14) According to a report by Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), during past few revolutionary years at least nine journalists and social activists were arrested and stood trial for covering political news regarding recent revolutions and tarnishing reputation of the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces (SCAF). Freedom House classified the Egyptian press as "partly free" prior to 2010 election, after the election and violation of election laws by the Mubarak government, they received a "not free" categorization (Moustafa, 2012: 36 & 45).

The Government's undisclosed decision – setting procedures on a number of major issues, such as budgeting for different departments or deletion/reduction of government subsidies are examples of violation of Voice and Accountability, showing how citizens were prevented from participation in their fate during the rule of Mubarak. Slogans such as "Pharaoh go, go, it's 80 million people's wish " or "Rule of the father, mother, son, is voided. We don't want inherited government", and the people's resistance until Mubarak's formal resignation meant that Hosni Mubarak was not the Egyptians' select or at least the majority of people did not support the legitimacy of the Mubarak's government.

We represented statistical data related to each indicator, obtained from the World Bank, in separate charts. Each figure will also include data of another three countries (one of which always achieved the highest score in each index and is often among the Nordic countries; Norway or Finland). Two other countries were selected from Arab States of the Middle East and North Africa in order to provide a clearer understanding of Egypt ranking position in each indicator.



Egypt ranks the lowest in this index always compared to other indicators. That means a very low percentage of Egyptians enjoyed the right to participate in political affairs such as selection of the ruling government. It also shows that since 2005, the latest round of presidential elections with apparent fraud, Egypt has significantly declined in the above index. ⁽²⁾

II. Political Stability and Absence of Violence: As much as political stability is based on development and reconstruction in society, political unrest and failure to promptly manage a crisis is interpreted as a government’s incompetence to institute order, security and law; thus, violence, chaos and breach of laws will increase. Urban turbulence, coup d’état, political terror and executions, social unrest, ethnic tensions, strikes and suppressive measures to maintain power are all signs of political instability which in most cases cannot be controlled by governments, often leading them to resort to force or incentives in the form of bribes or rent (e.g.


Arab countries in the Middle East).

The Mubarak Government was extremely unpopular and dependent on military-security forces. The government was dependant on the army and Western powers to establish political stability within the country and keep borders secure. But, that suppression could no longer guarantee the security, legitimacy, and political stability of Mubarak's system and social movements formed. Protests and social unrests, began primarily in industrial towns starting in 2006, advanced gradually, despite intense government crackdowns, expanded across Egypt and ultimately resulted in the fall of ruling government. (Bayat, 2010: 168)

Internal unrest and labor strikes in Egypt can be rooted in the following three general factors: Government's reliance on military and army forces. Emphasizing the distinction between power and violence, Hannah Arendt, states that the less a ruling government enjoys legitimacy and acceptability, the more it looks to suppression and the violent use of power, consequently, conflict and dissatisfaction between the people and government increase. (Nazif, 1994: 14). The way Gamal Abdel Nasser took power through military coup d'état in 1952, or Hosni Mubarak's presidency as a result of early assassination of the preceding President Anwar Sadat, demonstrates how the governing elites of Egypt used harsh policies to gain and keep the power. (Ghasemi, 2012: 40-41) Mubarak's reliance on Western powers, particularly the U.S: Egyptian citizens believed that Mubarak's policies during past three decades had weakened Egypt in terms of independence and especially Arab dignity. They demanded a new government that is politically independent. Widespread social inequality; Unemployment, a huge gap in wages, poverty, recession, inflation (food prices vs. income levels), unfair distribution of resources, and inability or unwillingness of the government to address problems in order to increase general welfare were all important factors leading Egyptians to strikes and engage in street demonstrations. (Bush, 1999: 55-59)

The first round of Egyptian protests were held in 2000 and 2003 in the form of a pseudo-revolution in objection to Israeli and imperialist activities. Then, from 2005 to 2010, protests focused on economic problems including increase of food/bread prices during which movements such as the "Kefaya" movement in 2004 formed. In the years between 2006 and 2011, thousands of strikes and social movements formed (Geresh, 2011: 6-10). Prior to 2008, strikes and protests were mostly objections to economic problems, but from 2008 onwards, such strikes turned into more pervasive movements, e.g., the youth movement of April, 6th and then eventually that of January 25th, 2011 that called for sociopolitical reforms in addition to economic reforms. In 2010, imprisonment of reporters or torture of dissidents was no longer effective to suppress objections; rarely could a day pass without at least three strikes across the country (Collombier, 2011: 2-3). Hostility towards the regime was widespread and not just limited to a few parties and factions. The people's rage trembled the seeming stability of the country and lead to the revolution in 2011.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence



This indicator always ranked below 25% in a relatively descending trend, especially in the 2000's.

III. Governance Effectiveness: Government policies should help the interests of people in business, efficiency of public institutions, improvement of performance quality of government employees, empowerment of government's strategic programmes, independency of public employment and deletion or ratification of complex, unnecessary and old rules. Proper and organised policies aided by the effective role of the public sector will enhance the country's growth and development. As a result, increased accountability and transparency in policies and efforts to block corruption channels in government pave the way for a nation's integrity.

Negotiations with IMF and World Bank in May 1987 and adoption of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in November 1991 (for loan purposes) was one of the most important policies approved by Mubarak's government in order to improve Egypt's economic situation (Bush, 1999: 94-97). However, such policy together with privatization of the public sector and incompetent agricultural reforms caused emergence of Crony Capitalism⁽³⁾, through which some businessmen monopolized markets and earned abundant wealth because of favorable relationships with government. However, "the average income was \$6200 (per capita) in Egypt" and 40% of Egyptian society lived with a daily least income of \$2 or less (CIA Factbook, 2015).

Under pressures of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and IMF, Mubarak cut subsidies on local consumer goods, nearly 400 companies converted to private ownership from the 1990's onwards, and unemployment rate rose to 14.4% in 2006 from 9.7% in 1988. Furthermore, global crisis and Mubarak's policies for attracting foreign investment exposed Egyptian's job market to more complicated challenges. Low employment vs. high release rate, 60% wage increase versus 300% increase in prices within 1978 to 1988, a

25% increase in food prices in 2007 while wages kept fixed for more than a decade and, overall, outstanding unemployment rates among young educated people were catastrophes of Mubarak's inefficient economic policies. (International Monetary Fund, 2011)

Mubarak's policies in other sectors such as education, health, tourism, judiciary, and ... were also weak and ineffective. In the education sector, graduates of training centers, schools and universities lacked needed knowledge or sufficient competitive skills. There were no meaningful relations between educational and employment system. Students graduated in a number of fields yet had no hope of finding employment in their field. As a result of the increasing gap between expectations regarding education and market realities, the young who had invested too much time and resources on education became frustrated. (Brown, in: *Revolution in the Arab World*, 201: 41) Most graduates, without a *wasta* (connections) or too poor to pay bribes had to wait for a job for several years or could perhaps expect to find a job at a restaurant and earn little as a waiter; at the end, they were still dependent on their parents. Egypt's major problems regarding the youth and the brain drain were also related to a lack of relationships between the education system and employers. (Ajami, 1995: 10-11)

In health sector, while much was spent on modernization and water/sewage refinement in tourist areas, thousands of Egyptians died due to lack of access to clean water. In 2008, nearly 62% of infants were born with various diseases such as diarrhea and many children suffered from vitamin A deficiency. In 2010, more than a third of children (below five years old) died due to malnutrition problems (Maternal and Child Health Data, 2013). According to the Ministry of Health and Population in African Society for Scientific Research and Technology, in many cases, despite effective rules and policies in different areas, no regulatory measures had been determined to watch implementation of relevant policies.

In the tourism sector, uncontrolled expansion of tourism trade,


government's ignorance to economic and welfare needs of the people and lack of practical policies based immoral relations between Egyptians and tourists who had travelled to Egypt for a variety of healthy or unhealthy recreation purposes, therefore, exposing the future generation of Egyptian society to various diseases, i.e. HIV/AIDS. Macro investment for government policies and large projects including army equipment were among other weak policies of Mubarak for which his government was indebted to international organizations. Despite inflation and increased poverty in Egypt, the government's heavy expenditures on the military continued. Mubarak cut the budgets of the health care and education sector. Accordingly, Egyptian annual budget for internal security was reportedly approximated at \$1.5 billion higher than that of country's health budget in 2006. (Ibrahim, 2011)

The Egyptian judicial system was enormously dependent on Mubarak's political institutions and provisions of which lacked binding influence. Every complaint had to go through an excessive bureaucratic system, which meant complexity and unwarranted expenditures of time and resources. Consequently, people preferred referring disputes to the Sheikhs (clergies) of Al-Azhar University and observing their verdicts as opposed to filing complaints with Egyptian courts, as latter required an important *wasta* or payment of bribes.

Generally, government's inappropriate policies regarding budget allocation to various sectors of educational, health and ..., and failure to adopt regulatory policies for implementation of relevant laws, especially for poverty relief, mostly hurt the middle-class, which comprises the largest group of society and its vulnerability is the gravest threat to the stability of a country. Mubarak's inefficient policies in the investment sector, disregarding the poor and emphasizing his personal interests, led Egyptian society to impoverishment. According to John Bradley, if Nasser was willing to demonstrate arrogance of the Arab nation, Mubarak brought nothing but poverty and degradation for his people. Egyptians' strikes and

their objections to working conditions and rights, etc., and organization of a variety of movements across the country all conveyed the people's dissatisfaction with Mubarak's policies and the performance of his government's officials and authorities.

Governance Effectiveness



Relatively low rating in the chart demonstrates the inefficiency of performance and policies of the Mubarak's Government.

IV. Regulatory Quality: the government's intervention in the economy, its controlling approach to monetary, financial and wage decisions, the level of tariff or non-tariff barriers, reduction of unnecessary import and export regulations, supervision on effectiveness of anti-monopoly policies, setting and enforcing appropriate policies and regulations that contribute to the growth of the private sector, and efficient use and proper distribution of resources dictate the quality of regulations in countries.

When first taking the power, Hosni Mubarak promised for structural policy reforms, however, his edicts made Egypt more socially and economically vulnerable than ever (el-Ghonemy, 2003: 18-20). For example, Egypt's current account deficit amounted to 5 billion Egyptian pounds (15% per capita) in 1986 and budget deficit

rose to 8.8 billion Egyptian pounds (23% per capita) (Abdel Meguid and others: 2011)

One of the unresolved problems of the Egyptian government was its opposition towards decentralization. Centralization of power, resources and decision-making in the hands of Government authorities rose during the time of Nasser and intensified during Mubarak's presidency. Egypt's laws were insufficient with regards to the prevention of monopolies of power and resources by particular persons or groups. For example, according to Ministry of Investment, the Cabinet is the sole decider of rent/sale of public lands. Furthermore, before launching any project, Cabinet's approval was compulsory. Such a inefficient legal framework increased the opportunity for special groups to take advantage; limited participation opportunities for middle-class, caused the spread of economic corruption, class gap, and social inequality.

Similarly, market regulations were extraordinary flexible to government decisions, so that Government would authoritatively adopt or modify rules by its Executive order, waiving Parliament laws. Taking advantages of such rules, Mubarak's cabinet had several times altered market laws in his (or his family's) interest; i.e. manipulated bonds' buy/sell rate for a favorite increase, decrease margin and frequently changed the facilities' regulations without oversight of needing confirmation (Bush, 1999: 103-110). Conversely, startup costs for a new business activity was so high that ordinary, and particularly young people, failed or gave up entering into the market or creating private enterprises, therefore, entrepreneurship was not encouraged among the poor.

Inefficient rules and complex beurocracies reduced investment opportunities while complicated loan conditions added to a long list of problems; i.e. individuals had to provide a registered collateral or property for a personal loan. Despite a comprehensive law on property registration, many Egyptians were reluctant to undergo the process because of complicated registration rules and high fees and

taxes; approximately 92% of Egyptians own unregistered properties at a value of \$248 billion. Subsequently, many investment opportunities were simply wasted due to the refusal of people subject themselves to expensive and complex bureaucratic systems. (Elsaman & Alshorbagy, 2011: 73-77) Similar to many government policies, which were designed with the interests of those affiliated with the government in mind, approval of tax laws and its weak performance in 2005 lead to more discrimination against low/middle class as well as micro businesses. According to tax law, regardless of unequal incomes, all citizens were considered equal in tax payment system and received same share of taxes.


Furthermore, based on law 114 in 2008, companies working in the production of oil, iron and chemical fertilizers were excluded from incentives and guarantees of the investment. This law was set to remove competitive opportunities and keep such industries exclusively under authority of a specific group of people associated with the government. Such laws discouraged individuals from pursuing their interest and ambitions in these fields (Elsaman & Alshorbagy, 2011: 72-75). Uncontrolled outflow of local currency and disorganized import of western goods supported western values and cultures rather than improved Egyptian's living standards. (Berr, 2011)

According to World Bank, an Egyptian merchant needs 218 days to obtain construction permits. Additionally, property registration would take a seven-stage procedure of 54 to 72 days, which costs equivalent of four and a half times the average income of an Egyptian. (Kandil, 2012) Having confronted such rules and high expenses, ordinary citizens who lacked connections with the government missed opportunities to partake in a trade. Therefore, many gave up the activity or became involved in the extreme corruption of Mubarak institutions. In general, economic and investment sectors suffer in Egypt mainly because of: 1) Increased dependency to external resources in order to finance economic development of the country. 2) Early downsizing of two dynamic

industries in basic and high-demand domestic product namely agricultural and industrials. 3) Government's reluctance to respect Non- Governmental Organizations' role (NGO's) in assisting infrastructural reforms including providing equal opportunities in business. (El-Ghonemy, 2003: 63-68)

In order to provide a better understanding of how Mubarak's Government affected social welfare, below find economic figures (2005 – 2009), prepared by Fahmy Howeid, prominent analyst of the Arab world, who believes "the truth of Egyptian economic distress was far beyond what had been released by Mubarak time": Reduction in the number of beds in Government hospitals from 156,000 to 129,000 despite the increase of population from 70 million to 76 million. Reduction the in number of health-care centers for children and mothers from 203 to 157 centers and reductions in special centers for low-income people from 106 to 43 centers. Reduction in cereal consumptions from 333k to 303k (per capita). Reduction in red meat consumption from 16k to 14k (per capita). Increased in illicit wealth acquisition files from yearly 650,000 to 800,000 cases. Increased in unemployment rate to 9% as well as inflation rates up to 12% from 4.8% and Increased in divorce rate; from 65,000 to 90,000. (Donya-e-EqtasadNewspaper, 2012).

People, especially the youth, noticed that right of people who confronted poverty, unemployment and thousands of economic problems were waived in laws and regulations. Government was not addressing high inflation, growing social gaps, and worsening working conditions (i.e. working hour, insurance, etc.). While economic crisis and wild increases in the price of food and energy was imposing pressure on the living standards of poor Egyptians, Government officials were busy with graft and strengthening its military support using public resources. Objection to such a weak ruling system was in the heart of Egyptian strikes and labor movements.



Egypt always located below the borderline, even while at its best position during the first years of the 2000's.

V. The Rule of law: Imposed expenses on governments due to crime in countries, the extent of people's trust in the government, the extent of the private sector's trust in the judicial system (power to take legal action against the government), and the ability of security forces to protect citizens from threats, are among the decisive measures applied in the establishment of the rule of law. It is also associated with social development and eradication of poverty. In each society, the poor require more support than the rich, which can be achieved through the establishment of the rule of law. Without this protection, the poor will be exposed to corruption, loss of personal property and insecurity. Police and the judicial system play an effective role in supporting citizens against robbery and violence, and reduce crime and corruption while helping to institute democracy and the rule of law.

Hosni Mubarak had promised to observe democracy, as well as, rule of law and act as a political reformist. In the early 1980's, political reforms and liberalization were being practiced, but the trend reversed during the next decades. The law 97 of 1992 threatened and isolating professional syndicates, and ruled that appointments of

mayors or deputy mayors shall be through governmental orders instead of fair elections; law 142 in 1994 decrease the credential and executive power of democratic associations in universities; and enforcement of emergency law were all symbols of violation of this indicator during Mubarak's presidency. Despite provisions 47 and 48 of the Constitution ratified in 1971, regarding the freedom of speech and the press, countless heavy penalties were considered in General Penal Code of Egypt for disrespecting public officials including the President and heads of local or foreign governments. Scope of activities of social institutions and non-profit humanitarian organizations, which could play a significant role in instituting of the rule of law, became subject to governmental permit and were drastically limited to approved framework of governmental principles (Moustafa, 2012: 36-37).

The former National Democratic Party (NDP), was affiliated with the Presidency and always had control of two-thirds of seats in Parliament; accordingly, the President had the permanent authority to implement his desired rules and orders through his representatives in parliament. In fact, the legislative branch was established just as a legal device to maintain government hegemony on society. (Abolhassan Shirazi and Rasouli, 2011: 90-91) While criminals were appointed to lead government organizations and were freely engaging in numerous crimes including theft, torture, bribery and others. The army and security force, were also enjoying full authority and practicing violence against ordinary people, with no threat from the judicial system.

Based on the Constitution, the judicial system was the only organization that could officially limit the activities of the Executive branch and while other doors were closed to the public, courts were only in places that leftists, Islamists, liberals, and other citizens could refer to challenge executive authorities. However, Mubarak's direct supervision of the judicial system had transformed it to a passive, dependent, and bureaucratic system. Therefore, many local and


foreign clients preferred instead to solve their disputes and problems through some other channels. Based on the Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (ACDRLI) in 2000/2001, Egyptian courts had been received 14,393,809 filings, comprising of 2,249,065 civil, 10,813,167 criminal, and 1,331,577 personal cases. In the same year, judges were numbered at 3,466, including 219 counselor sat cassation courts, 1,569 counselor sat appeal courts and 1678 judges in primary and other affiliated courts. Accordingly, every single judge was in charge of more than 4100 cases (nearly 520 different cases) within eight months. Therefore, judges could unlikely make precise and comprehensive decisions. Furthermore, in many cases, the judge's inability to handle plentiful cases in a very restricted time, delayed handling of some cases up to one year or so. (Moustafa, 2012: 40-42)

The army and police's violent behavior, public surveillance under the pretext of fighting terrorism, and increase of poverty and social chaos provided people with more reasons for distrust the ruling government. If Sadat and Nasser arrested and imprisoned citizens for political reasons, in Mubarak's time anyone could experience the police abuse for any reason. (al-Bishri, 2011) Khaled Said was a young and apolitical 28-year-old man from the middle class; but the violent behavior of police with resulted in his death, pictures of which were posted on Twitter which drove exhausted and helpless Egyptians to the streets shouting, "We are all Khaled Said." Police was everywhere, inspecting people. According to a citizen, police power had turned to a gun pointing to the citizens instead of enforcement of rule of law. In a society where the police, with no need to justify his activities, is not supportive of the people and treats them unfairly, insecurity and distrust reaches its highest level. (Goldstone, 2011: 330-332) According to Tariq al-Bishri, director at the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), "contrary to what is expected from the Ministry of the Interior, torture was practiced by the military using various methods including beating, electric shock, hanging down

from the wrists or ankles, threatening with rape and murder or affiliates' sexual harassment."

As per EOHR, within 1993 to 2007, more than 550 cases of torture were reported in addition to 567 victims, 167 of whom died because of the police's violent behavior. "We used to justify violent police behavior linking it to security reasons, but death of Khaled Said showed that police would never do anything for the people and their security. Police can harm us more than anything else can in this country. Police can put each of us in any unethical position", Fatima Abbas, a street protester said. (Salem, 2011: 33)

Egyptian's consecutive rallies on Police National Day, i.e. Jan. 25, and the youth movement on Jan. 25, 2011 following the fatality of Khaled Said at the hands of police- showed Egyptian's will to condemn the security force for its corrupt and anti-humanitarian behavior and object to the failure of the government to prevent crimes. People's distrust with government authorities, corruption and humiliation performed by Mubarak's agents and his failure to establish rule of law motivated the poor and severely damaged masses for revolution in 2011. In their rhetoric, protesters called for establishment of new system under laws of which the poor's right is not ignored, human dignity as well as social justice is respected, and most importantly the judicial system has the power to guarantee the enforcement of rule of law and pursue the criminals; governmental or non-governmental.



On this index, Egypt ranked slightly above the borderline, at its best position.

VI. Control of Corruption: This is necessary to reduce corruption in a political system and among public officials and authorities and to increase for foreign investment and economic activities. Control of corruption will reduce the prevalence of bribery (Worldwide Governance Indicators, Country Data Report for Egypt, 1996–2012). Authorities use resources, power and government facilities to attain their personal goals allow corruption in the ruling government and other various economic, social, cultural and political parts of the country.

Bribery, blackmail, embezzlement, hefty and minor burglaries had run through various sectors of the country including tourism industry, the press and media, the educational and economic system, and others. For example, cultural and social corruption had lain Egyptian society long miles away from its ancient rich civilization and even from not-so-old cultures of the country, such as the pan-

Arabism and Nasserism. Many experts believe that Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, were formed mainly in response to prevalent social and cultural corruption in Egypt.

Widespread corruption and discrimination in various sectors of society shaped people's problems, such as social gaps, youth unemployment, and other; as well as headed the frustrated people to revolutionary movements against Hosni Mubarak. In terms of economic crisis, when more than 40% of the Egyptians barely subsisted with less than two dollars a day, assets of the Mubarak family were measured between \$40 to 70 billion, Mubarak's wealth was \$17 billion and assets of 39 high ranking authorities of government or businessmen associated with Jamal, Mubarak's son, estimated more than a billion dollars each. (Niakoe, 2011: 251-252)

Inflation, increase in food prices and subsidies ineffective system made people resort to bizarre ways (against values of a standard society) in order to increase their meager earnings (Hajinaseri and Asadi, 2012: 218-225). Strategy of free market, adopted by Mubarak, increased financial corruption so that bribes (in small and large amounts) were known as a customary way of earning for governmental or non-governmental employees. Based on the International Transparency in 2011, Egypt was ranked 112, as extensively corrupt, among 183 countries.

Corruption in the Legislative branch and Supervisory Electoral Board prevented fair and legitimate elections on both parliamentary and presidential levels. Parliament was dependent on Mubarak's agents and lacked the required authority and power to criticize the performance of the Executive branch or challenge its inefficient policies which were largely applied in order to satisfy ruling party's officials. While the people's dissatisfaction with the ruling government was dramatically increasing, Hosni Mubarak would be declared as the winner of election every coming year. In 2005, for the first time during Mubarak's presidency, two-candidate elections were held and, again, Mubarak was declared as the winner for the fourth time.

(Farooqi, 2010)

Similarly, Egyptian electoral board held the parliamentary election in 2010 with apparent fraud occurred. Manipulating results of the elections, Mubarak and National Democratic Party (NDP) took hold of political power and instigated the spread of political and other symbols of corruption. In parliamentary elections in 2010, Alvatani or NDP, kept all of its 88 members from 2005, won 420 seats out of 508. Only 15 seats went to the opposition parties and one to the Muslim Brotherhood, remaining seats had gone to other candidates who were allegedly independent; but actually affiliated to NDP (Collombier, 2011). According to Ahmed Okasha, Electoral fraud had discouraged citizens from participation in elections. He referred to the report by Egyptian High Court of Appeal as per which 90 members of parliament were elected by fraud. (Bradley, 2008, p. 35)

Corruption among the security and army forces, besides rules such as emergency law, were all means to follow political suppression and prevent objections or freedom of opinions rather than providing national security. There are several reports regarding the arrest, interrogation and torture of innocent citizens by the police; countless people who were imprisoned without certain crime and kept imprisoned until they could afford paying bribes through. Also, in many other reports related to embezzlement or destruction of public property (like stealing antiques of the Egyptian National Museum), Egyptian police have been always involved.

Corrupt government and involvement of profit-seeking amateurs in the tourism industry, exposed the industry to serious harms. According to Egyptologists, the pyramids have been severely damaged during recent years of development in the tourism industry comparing to four thousand years before. Failure in instituting a recording and registering system for antiques and public properties, the disappearance or trafficking and selling of such properties was constantly carrying out and not legally prohibited until 1983. Many Egyptian antiques are still smuggled and shipped out of Egypt

because of profound corruption among guards and some export companies. (Bradley, 2008: 151-153)


Corruption in the public sector had also broken into the media and the press, which are mainly responsible for information and transparency. John Bradley, writes in his book "Inside Egypt", quoting Salama Ahmed Salama, a columnist at the al-Ahram newspaper, that many journalists and media activists had responded positively to alluring offers of Government officials to publish false news or give up revealing the government's disgraced secrets in order to get rid of their poor financial conditions or obtain a better position at work. Accordingly, the facts published in opposition newspapers were in contradiction with contents of government newspapers and the government would accuse opposition newspapers of printing false information. Such measures would pave the way for prevalence of corruption, quality reduction in different jobs in various fields.(i.e. permit for the preservation and distribution of expired medicines.)

Prevalent corruption was practiced heavily in Egypt. From taxi drivers who demanded more money from tourists to informal or formal relations (or marriages) that took place among the poor and middle-classes of Egypt with male and female tourists for financial incentives. NDP (Alvatani) would conduct fraudulent activities in the parliamentary and presidential elections to the Judicial system, which overlooked the crimes committed by political authorities or governmental elites; from army and security forces, who continued suppression of citizen by means of terror, torture and pursuit compiling wealth through running economic-commercial projects instead of establishment of security. According to the editor of Almasry-al-Youm, an independent newspaper, "There is a corruption-related case reported every two minutes in Egypt, and only ten percent of those types of violations get caught"(Bradley, 2008: 159-163).

Egyptian novelist, Sonalla Ibrahim, refused the award of the 2003 Nobel Conference because a government, which lacked required

credibility, issued it. He expressed, “We have no theatre, cinema, scientific research or education. We have festivals, conferences, and a box of lies. We have no industry, agriculture, health, education, or justice; corruption and looting spread and those who object are humiliated, beaten, and tortured. The exploitative minority among us plunged us into this horrible reality” (Bradley, 2008: 168-169). Youssef Chahine, famous Egyptian filmmaker behind “chaos” (2007), narrates the structure of torture and corruption in the police of Egypt, and in “the Sparrow” (1973), blames government corruption for Egypt's defeat in the Six-Day War. He believes that Egyptian youth are aimless souls dreaming of leaving the country; every day a large number of young Egyptians line up in front of German and French Embassy in dream of emigration. I used to encourage them to stay but now I tell them to go. Here all is corrupt and you'll be corrupt as well, if you stay.” (Bradley, 2008: 170-171)

The Transparency International Organization performs a yearly ranking of countries based on “corruption in governments”. Scores vary from zero (completely corrupt) to ten (corruption-free). According to the report in 2010, Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, Finland, and Sweden received the highest scores (9.3 and 9.2), whereas Somalia, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Iraq, received the lowest scores (1.1 to 1.5). Egypt was ranked as 98th (score: 3.1) among 178 countries (12th in the Middle East and North Africa) close to Mexico and Burkina Faso and in a group of very corrupt governments (Transparency International, 14.08.2013).



This index has generally shown a descending trend, stating that corruption was deep-rooted in Mubarak's government.

Table below briefly shows figures offered by the World Bank and other international organizations on Indicators of Good Governance in Egypt⁽⁵⁾.

Index		1996 - 2010
Voice and Accountability	The World Bank (one to 100%) ⁽⁶⁾	Always ranked between 23 to 25% (out of 100%), in 2002, declined to 13% and during 2002 to 2010 rated between 23 to 25%.
	Freedom House (numerical rating on a scale from one; most free to seven; least free) (Moustafa, OP. cit.: 45)	Always ranked as "not free". In 2005, 2007 and 2011 showed average rating of 2.2 in best position, as "partly free".
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	The World Bank (one to 100%)	Always ranked 24-26%. Within 1998 to 2000 showed a significant growth which immediately followed by a dramatic decline in the coming years, ranked 18% in 2010.
	Failed States Index (Ibid. p. 47) (one to 120; the higher value states the greater political stability in the country)	During past six years, Egypt, with a very weak democracy, always ranked 40, at subgroup of "at risk" and in border with very vulnerable countries in subgroup of "sensitive" countries; such as Syria and Yemen, below other leading countries during Arab Springs i.e. Libya and Tunisia.
Governance Effectiveness	The World Bank (one to 100%)	Always ranked below 50%.
	Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ⁽⁷⁾ (Zero to One) ⁽⁸⁾	Ranked 0.50 Within 1996 to 2000 whereas 0.38 within 2004 to 2010.

Regulatory Quality	The World Bank (one to 100%)	Except some few years, mostly ranked below 40%.
	World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey (GCD) ⁽⁹⁾ (Zero to One)	Except early years, always ranked below 0.45.
The Rule of Law	The World Bank (one to 100%)	Always ranked 50 to 55%, with a remarkable decline in the last years of Mubarak governance.
	Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (HER) ⁽¹⁰⁾ (Zero to One)	Averagely, scored 0.45.
Control of Corruption	The World Bank (Oneto 100%)	Always ranked below 40% with a remarkable decline during Mubarak Governance.
	Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (PRS) (Zero to One)	Averagely scored between 0.25 to 0.33.

Conclusion

The Egyptian revolution was for some reasons distinct from other street protests in the Middle East. Though organised by various activists, it lacked a single leader and enjoyed credibility among different people from diverse faiths and parties; protesters were committed to establishing socioeconomic and democratic reforms as their revolutionary aims (Casagranda, March 2010), and political activists used social networks such as Facebook and Twitter to make their voice heard and popularize their movement faster.

Egyptians called for the ousting of Mubarak (after 30 years of absolute rule), cancellation of the abiding emergency law (in force since 1967), increase of wages and dismissal of Habib Aladeli, Minister of Interior, who had authorised so much violence in Egypt by the police. Uprisings went on for 18 consecutive days through February 11th, when ultimately the army declared the legality of the people's demands and abandoned violence. The people's resistance ended with Mubarak's removal and establishment of an interim military government (Mousavi, 2011).

Egyptians were claiming the same principles that had previously been studied and investigated by the experts at the World Bank and other international organisations under the title of good governance. Hence, this article placed emphasis on the weakness or lack of good

governance and its six indicators as the fundamental reasons for the 2011 revolution. Based on the findings of this research, the Mubarak government failed to establish good governance, as none of the indicators have been observed in the last three decades.

1. Voice and Accountability; Mubarak had already lost its legitimacy for several reasons; holding single-candidacy presidential elections, manipulating the results of presidential or parliamentary elections, preventing activities of NGO's and associations and others; its noteworthy that many international organizations such as Freedom House ranked Egypt as a non-free country.

2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence; people's dissatisfaction with Mubarak's dependency on Western powers as well as long-lasting emergency law to maintain his hegemony, and increasing gap between the poor and rich led people to social movements which developed politically in order to finally put an end to autocrat governance of Mubarak.

3. Governance Effectiveness; government's inappropriate policies in different sectors of education, health, economy, tourism, judiciary, transportation, and ... and its failure to adopt regulatory procedures for implementation of relevant laws had caused degradation of Egyptian society by increasing the living expenses.

4. Regulatory Quality; inefficient and unfair rules such as tax law and subsidies, uncontrolled currency flow, irrational uncompetitive market conditions, discriminative tariffs, investment and commercial barriers plus mismanaged and unequal investment rules, had exposed people to hardship, unemployment, and widespread social turmoil for which government is to be blamed. (Ahmadian, 2011: 205-213)

5. Rule of Law; Mubarak's direct control on judicial system turned it to a passive institution employed to maintain the hegemony of the Mubarak family. Police, also, was rather an organization against the citizens rather than being a helping arm. Therefore, people were led to other formal or informal channels to resolve their problems. That created a lot of corruption and mischief, which contributed to

the 2011 revolution.

6. Control of Corruption; widespread corruption through inducement, blackmail, fraud, substantial and minor burglaries were prevalently practiced in various sectors of the country including the tourism industry, the press and media, educational and economic system, and so on. As per the statistics of Transparency International, Egypt was ranked as extensively corrupt in 2011 prior to the revolution.

Based on the collected data and analysis provided, it's concluded that extensive corruption in the public sector, socioeconomic disparity, lack of transparency in the political system, inefficiency of public institutions, centralisation of power, resources and special authorities in the hands of a group associated with the ruling government, government's unresponsive attitude, and ultimately non-fulfilment of good governance principles, as well as, the increasing gap between the rich and poor led to the instability and vulnerability of the political system, which eventually resulted in the Egyptian revolution in January 2011.

Due to the current unrest and chaos, it is not certain if Egyptians will successfully meet their revolutionary goals. The army is still running the country; society is still suffering from too much corruption, poverty, and many other socio-political problems. The Egyptian government still lacks interaction channels with people and people have to move toward internal tension and turmoil in order to communicate their needs rather than forming peaceful dialogue and civil society. So far, Egyptians have suffered a lot and paid heavily for their desire of establishing political stability and freedom. It seems that foundational reforms are needed to reconstruct the trust, confidence, and hope among the Egyptians. The new ruling system needs to move towards political reforms immediately, increase of accountability, supporting freedom of speech, and transparency of decision making and information in order to win citizens' trust and confidence and restore political stability in the country.

Notes

1. Each chart shows indicators' status based on percentile ranking; from zero (lowest point) to 100 (highest point) within 1996 to 2010. To provide a comparative picture, three other countries' chart (the most high-ranking country in each index as well as two other countries, one of which is located in the Middle East) are also displayed.
2. Diagrams have been drawn by the author, using statistical data provided by the World Bank.
3. Capitalism Dependent on the Government.
4. Generally, reviewing diagrams of all six indicators, Egypt had been always positioned at weak or average (at best position) level; the descending trend in every single indicator states overall weakness of good governance's indicators especially in the last years of Mubarak's reign.
5. For more info., refer to link below: [http:// info. worldbank. org/ governance/ wgi/ pdf/ c67.pdf](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c67.pdf), 22.08.2013.
6. World Bank statistics are shown in percentile (%). Accordingly, when Egyptian position on Voice and Accountability in 2002 is specified with 13%, it means that Egypt's position is only 13% better and stronger compared to other 87% countries in the world and is weaker or worse in comparison with other 87% countries.
7. www.EIU.com
8. Where indicators scored based on zero and one, zero means the least or weakness and one means the maximum or strength of the index's performance in the country. On this basis, Egypt, ranking 0.50 in this index, had been placed on the borderline.
9. www.WEFORUM.org.
10. www.Hertiage.org.

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